Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Naturalism, philosophy: The view that we must regard the phenomena which meet us, even those which we consider to be our own states, as processes controlled by laws of nature. Their understandability is not guaranteed. See also nature, naturalized epistemology.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

John McDowell on Naturalism - Dictionary of Arguments

I 18
Definition "blunt naturalism"/McDowell: refuses to acknowledge that the relationships that constitute the logical space of the reasons are not natural.
>Space of reasons
.
I 92
Definition "blunt naturalism"/McDowell: denies that the spontaneity of the mind is sui generis.
The blunt naturalism aims to place the conceptual abilities in nature, presented as the realm of natural laws.
Abolition of the distinction between the space of reasons and nature.
This means that what is natural is disenchanted.
  (Disenchantment of nature).
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I 102
Naturalism/McDowell: a different kind of naturalism than the blunt naturalism equates nature with the field of natural laws. But it is a different concept of updating our nature:
We must bring the susceptibility for the meaning back into the operations of our natural sensibilities as such.
This does not mean, however, that susceptibility for the meaning can be captured naturalistically (in the sense of natural laws).
>Meaning/McDowell, >Understanding/McDowell, >Nature/McDowell.
This looks as if we had to stand with one foot inside and with the other outside nature. This is not naturalism at all.
  But we must not see ourselves as divisive, the exercise of our spontaneity belongs to our way of realizing ourselves as animals.
>Spontaneity/McDowell.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,


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