Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Motifs: motifs are reasons for actions in conscious beings. Motifs can be conscious or unconscious, but their bearers must, in principle, be capable of conscious actions. Motifs can be stronger and less strong distinct.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Gilbert Ryle on Motives - Dictionary of Arguments

Danto II 323
Motive/Ryle/Danto: motives are not causes. Motivational explanations are law-like sentences.
>Reason/Cause
.
AnscombeVsRyle: this is only possible for generalizations - a design for a one time lie would dispose one to constant lies.
>Disposition.
- - -
Ryle I 110 ff
Motive/Ryle: motives are not accompanied by feelings! They are dispostional, not causal and are to be recognized by regularity, lawlike - alien motives are recognizable as well as own motives.
>Regularity.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969


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