Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Possible World: entity that can be quantified over. There ist a dispute over the question whether possible worlds exist or are only assumed for purposes of proofs of completeness. See also actual world, modal logic, modal realism, realism, actualism, possibility, possibilia, quantification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Possible Worlds - Dictionary of Arguments
I 41 Possible World/difference/differentiation/Field: E.g. we cannot postulate a possibel world which is isomorphic to ours and in which only Nixon is like Humphrey (here) and Humphrey like Nixon (here) - (throughout the whole story). >Cross world identity, cf. >Centered worlds. I 75 Possible Worlds/Lewis: (Counterfactuals, Section 4.1): possible Worlds are 4-dimensional slices of a broader reality, like other possible world. All together form the actual universe. FieldVsLewis. NominalismVsPossible Worlds: these are abstract entities. I 222 Problem of quantities/Possible World/Field: with possible world and cross-world-congruence we could avoid the possibility operator. FieldVs: we exactly wanted to avoid the ontology of the space-time regions. Possible World/Field: are only heuristically harmless. I 223 Possible World/StalnakerVsLewis: (Stalanker 1976)(1): Alternative to Lewis: Speech of possible worlds should be understood as a speech about a property Q, so it is necessary that if the universe has Q, then there is x*, y*, z*, w* and u*, so that F (x*, y*, z*, w*, u*). Problem: How should we understand the cross-world congruence? The last incidents of x* are not bound by quantifiers during the comparison. FieldVsStalnaker: Problem: interpretation of the expression "spatial relation". --- II 89 Possible world/Quantities of/Field: what is relevant for sets of possible worlds as objects of states of the mind is that they form a Boolean algebra. N.B.: then the elements themselves need not be a possible world - any other kind of elements are then just as good for a psychological explanation. They could simply be everything - e.g. numbers. Numbers: do not pretend to represent the world as it is. II 90 Intentionality/Possible world/FieldVsStalnaker/Field: The wit of the possible world assumption is the Boolean Algebra, the boolean relation that prevails between possible worlds. Problem: then the empty set of possible worlds which contains the trisection of the angle, which is a subset of the set of the possible world, in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Problem: what fact does that make? - Without it the approach is meaningless. >Nonfactualism. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker, 1976. Possible Worlds. ous 10, 65-75._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Possible Worlds
