Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Metalanguage: metalanguage is the language in which linguistic forms, the meaning of expressions and sentences, the use of language, as well as the admissibility of formations, and the truth of statements are discussed. The language you refer to is called object language. A statement about the form, correctness, or truth of another statement thus includes both, i.e. object language and meta language. See also richness, truth-predicate, expressiveness, paradoxes, mention, use, quasi-reference, quotation, hierarchy, fixed points._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Metalanguage - Dictionary of Arguments
X 71 Metalanguage/Set Theory/Quine: in the metalanguage a stronger set theory is possible than in the object language. In the metalanguage a set z is possible so that ERz applies - ((s) A set of that is the satisfaction relation (in the form of a set of ordered pairs) - not in the object language, otherwise >Grelling paradox. >Set Theory/Quine, >Object Language/Quine. X 61 Object Language/Metalanguage/Mention/Use/(s): the object language is mentioned (it is spoken about), the metalanguage is used to talk about the object language. Object Language/Metalanguage/OS/MS/ordered pairs/Quine: if we define ordered pairs ('x,y': the set whose only elements are {{x},1} and {{y},2}.), this does not mean that in the object language the variables could also take sets or ordered pairs as values. We use the ordered pairs only in metalanguage. Metalanguage: is the everyday language in which we talk about logic. For example, if I say that the pair '3.5' fulfills the sentence "x < y" then I temporarily assume that the sentence "x < y" belongs to the object langauge and that the numbers 3 and 5 belong to the subject area of the object language. But I don't have to assume that the ordered pairs '3,5' belong to the object language. It is enough that it belongs to metalanguage, and it does. Fulfillment/metalanguage/object language/Quine(s): what fulfills belongs to metalanguage, what is fulfilled to object language_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Metalanguage
