Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Roderick Chisholm on Meaning (Intending) - Dictionary of Arguments
I 98 Meaning-that-principle/Chisholm: should be a reference to the meaning de dicto: accepted proposition or fact. - E.g the vagabond means that Karl called the police. Even if he did not know the name: that is ok. >de dicto.- E.g., His school mates believed that the future pope would never become a clergyman. >de re. I 100 (with respect to/(s): here: the speaker assigns meaning to a false object.) (De re). I 156ff Meaning (to mean) de re/Chisholm: of the greatest spy... problem: maybe there is none. Two meanings: A) There is a thing, and the one who means identifies it as that to which he ascribes a property (broad conception) B) The one who means identifies a particular thing as that of which he means something (narrow conception, still descriptive dependent). I 163 Wide view: A: it is easy for the thing to be held for something (corresponds to indirect attribution). >Attribution. Narrow view: B: it is difficult for the thing to be held for something by someone else. I 169 Belief de re/Chisholm: early, problem: cannot be explained de dicto, otherwise: e.g. because I know that the more valuable is the more valuable, I must choose both objects in the event of an error: 1. the one of which I believe it wrongly, 2. the right, because I believe of the more valuable ... Chisholm late: solution: the thing is also identified as the thing of which the subject believes ... --- II 128 Meaning (to mean)/Wittgenstein: no aiming at an object - no mental activity - paragraph § 689 - neither can the mental explain meaning and reference, nor vice versa. A picture is as less related to an object from itself as a sentence. - Only the use makes it to do it. >Use, cf. >Picture theory. Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Chisholm
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning (Intending)
