Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Materialism: A. Materialism in philosophy of mind is the view that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental states and consciousness, are results of material interactions of material things. See also Identity theory, Functionalism, Consiousness. - B. Materialism in political philosophy is the view that the material conditions of a society, such as its economic system and technological development, are the primary determinants of its social and political structures. See also Economic systems, Society, State, Economy._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Materialism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 47 SearleVsMaterialism: wrong question: how particles without intelligence produce intelligence (higher status, simple dynamic organization). >Levels(Order), >Description level. I 18 ff "Eliminative materialism": eliminative materialism is the idea that there is no such thing as "desires", "hopes", "fears", etc.. (Feyerabend 1963, Rorty 1965). I 27 Together with the Cartesian tradition, we have inherited a vocabulary, and with it certain categories. The vocabulary is not harmless, because it implicitly contains various theoretical assertions whose falsity is almost certain: apparent opposites: physical/spiritual, body/mind. Materialism/mentalism, matter/soul. It contains the assumption that, strictly speaking, one and the same phenomenon cannot satisfy both limbs of the pair of opposites. Therefore, we should believe that something spiritual cannot be physical. I 40 SearleVsMonism, SearleVsMaterialism: Monism and materialism are equally missed. The real mistake was to start counting at all! >Monism, >dualism, >Cartesianism. What exactly does "materialism" mean? One might perhaps think that it consists in the view that the microstructure of the world is entirely composed of material particles. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that this conception is compatible with almost every philosophy of mind. Today, however, no one believes in the existence of immortal spiritual substances. I 53 Either identity-theoretical materialism ignores the spirit, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is false; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism. I 62 Def "elimininative materialism": Stich and Churchland are of the opinion that there are no states of mind at all. >Churchland, Patricia, >Churchland, Paul. Materialism adopts the worst assumption of dualism. I 72 The deepest reason for this fear of consciousness is that consciousness probably does not have a solution to the characteristics of subjectivity. >Subjectivity. I 112 The question of how to "naturalize" consciousness does not arise at all; it is already completely natural! >Consciousness, cf. >Identity theory. . Paul Feyerabend (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. In: Review of Metaphysics 17 (1):49-67 2. Richard Rorty !1965). Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories. In: Review of Metaphysics 19 (1):24-54_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Materialism
