Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Conventions: Conventions are agreements on approval and disapproval of actions that may have been made explicitly once, but have evolved over time to a more or less unconscious basis for the coordinated action of most members of a group or society. These conventions, on the other hand, lead to the expectation of certain consequences of actions.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Ludwig Wittgenstein on Conventions - Dictionary of Arguments

Hintikka I 192
Convention/Phenomenology/Physics/Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the only conventionalism Wittgenstein allows refers to the choice between different phenomenological entities and this is based on the thesis that both phenomenological entities he mentions are secondary in relation to the physical objects.
I 264
How do you know someone has a toothache when they hold their cheek? Here we have reached the end of our wisdom, i.e. we have reached the conventions.
These "conventions" are exactly what Wittgenstein calls "criteria" in other parts of this discussion. They are the "hard rock" of the semantics of the term "toothache".
"To use a word without justification does not mean to use it wrongly. Of course, I do not identify my feeling by criteria, but I use the same expression.
I 303
Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the name relationships are conventional, but the essence of the names is not.
"In logic we do not express what we want, but the nature of natural signs expresses itself."
The non-conventional element of language: "But if we transform all those signs (occurring in a sentence) into variables, there is still such a class. But this does not depend on any agreement, but only on the nature of the sentence. It corresponds to a logical form of a logical archetype."
Symbol/Everyday Language/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in everyday language there are all kinds of senseless connections of symbols. In order to maintain the reflection concept, these must be excluded by conventional rules. The nature of our symbols alone does not eliminate them by itself.
II 27
Learning/Wittgenstein: we learn/teach the language by using it. The language convention is communicated by combining the sentence and its verification.
Def "Understanding"/Wittgenstein: means to be guided by language convention to the right expectation.
II 35
Conventions/Wittgenstein: presuppose the applications of language - they say nothing about its applications. For example: that red differs from blue from red from chalk is verified formally, not experimentally.
II 75
Convention/Wittgenstein: assessing belongs to (learning) history. And we are not interested in the story here if we are interested in the moves of the game. Learning, >Language Learning/Wittgenstein.
II 181
Observation Concepts/Theory/Criterion/Wittgenstein: what is understood in a theory as the reason for a belief is a matter of convention.
II 230
Arbitrary/Arbitrariness/Convention: Number systems are arbitrary - otherwise a different spelling would correspond to different facts.
II 231
Of course you can give meaning to new sentences and symbols - that is why the conventions are arbitrary.
II 238
Logic/Convention/Arbitrariness/Wittgenstein: the laws of logic, e.g. the sentences of the Excluded Third (SaD) and the Contradiction to be excluded (SvW) are arbitrary!
To forbid this sentence means to adopt what may be a highly recommended system of expression.
IV 26
Sentence/Tractatus: 3.317 the determination of the values is the variable. It is the specification of the sentence whose common characteristic is the variable.
The fixing is a description of these sentences.
The fixing will only deal with symbols, not their meaning.
Convention: it is only essential that it does not say anything about what is described.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989


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