Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Theory of neural networks as an explanation for mind states.:

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
IV 199/200
Fodor/LeporeVsConnecionsm: the connectionists draw charts in which the labels (name of the node) say what the intentional interpretation is supposed to be - but no theory explains how the node came to its label. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: Churchland makes the same mistake - this is just semantics by stipulation. It does not matter whether semantics is postulated for points or entire dimensions.
IV 201
Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies - the brain represents red things as red and aunts as aunts! - (Not as objects with certain psychophysical properties) - otherwise we could find out anything with introspection - there are very different interpretations of its charts possible.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


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