Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Rudolf Carnap on Descriptions - Dictionary of Arguments
VI 16 Descriptions/Carnap: there is the possibility of a unique system of descriptions within a subject area, without ostension. Problem: one cannot decide a priori whether it is possible in the concrete case. This question is particularly important when it comes to the entire field of knowledge objects. Here, too, it cannot be decided a priori. But the assumption of this possibility is the necessary prerequisite for the possibility of a supersubjective, purely rational science. VI 17 Unambiguity: how is it possible to have unique descriptions for objects within an area without using any objects outside the area for help? E.g. railway map, stylized, topologically distorted. Only points and connections. How to determine the names of cities? We look for the nodes of the highest order, where the largest number of lines converge. VI 18 If two points have the same number, they are "homotop", i.e. they have the same structural properties. Then this relation is not sufficient for a unique identification. We would have to use other relations. Gradually, all real scientific terms will be used, including cultural ones, etc. If there is still no difference, the places are scientifically indistinguishable. The fact that they are subjectively different, e.g. that I am here and not there, makes no difference scientifically! Because someone else will say the same thing: "I am here and not there". >Indistinguishability. VI 19 Structure: must be sufficiently diverse for identification. (>characteristic). >Structure, >Features._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Carnap
