Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gottlob Frege on Intentionality - Dictionary of Arguments
II 52 Purpose/intention: Frege: the purpose is a thought, therefore it has an "oblique meaning" (German: ungerade Bedeutung). Imperative: is "oblique speech" (German: ungerade Rede) and has no "meaning" only "sense". Command and wish are no thoughts, but on the same level. The "meaning" of the instruction sentence: is the command. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Oblique speech (= quote to the point), >Thought, >Intention._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Intentionality
