Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intentionality: intentionality is the ability of people and higher animals to relate to and react to circumstances such as things and states. Concepts, words, and sentences also refer to something but have no intentionality. This linguistic relating-to is called reference instead._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Intentionality - Dictionary of Arguments
Dennett I 599 Searle/Fodor: e.g. a freezing robot (Dennett): this robot does not have a correct intentionality, only an as-if intentionality. >As-if intentionality. Dennett: this is a distinction without reference. --- Fodor IV 14 Intentionality/holism/Fodor/Lepore: property T*: a belief only has this property when it expresses a proposition that the content of one or another belief is by me. E.g. if someone asks about a color, you will first think of red. Problem: if we have biographically different thoughts, it may turn out that none of your thoughts has property T* in relation to my thoughts. Then only one of us could have thoughts about color and red. Another problem: a change of opinion and of beliefs could not be explained. >Colour. VsIntentional Laws: Quine, Dennett, Davidson, Churchlands, Stich. IV 127f Belief is not a basic concept in the theory of intentionality. Instead: representations are a basic concept. IV 130 Intentional attribution: an intentional assignment is not limited by rationality, because representations may also be irrational (inconsistent) or fantastic. >Attribution, >Representation, >Rationality, >Deceptions. Fodor/Lepore Vs: that would be a change of subject, irrational propositional attitudes would be no intentional states. >Irrationality. Constitutive of belief: rationality: not at the same time that p and that not-p, but objects of intentional states may be contradictory. >Objects, >Thinking._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 |
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> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Intentionality
