Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefore, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Rudolf Carnap on Intensions - Dictionary of Arguments

VII 146
Extension/Carnap: E.g. class of all blue objects - E.g. intension of "blue" in English: the quality of being blue - intension, not extension makes us understand statements.
VII 149
Intension/Carnap: the analysis of the intension for a natural language is just as reliable as that of the extension!
QuineVs: pragmatic intension terms are unclear and mysterious.
VII 150
Quine: that is in principle, it is not only about the generally accepted technical difficulty of the determination.
Carnap: Question: Assuming that the linguist can determine the extension, how can he also determine the intension?
In any case, this is a completely new step:
For example, suppose that two field linguists have reached complete agreement on the extensions of the natives.
Now it is still possible to attribute different intensions to the predicates thus fixed extensionally!
Because there is more than one and possibly infinitely many different properties, whose extension in the given area is just the extension for which the predicate in question has been determined!
Example (s) If all considered dogs are brown, it is not clear whether the color or the dogs were picked out.
Carnap: In addition, quadruped could be meant if the descriptive word is unknown. The whole extension would also be covered.

VII 151
Intensionalist thesis of pragmatism/CarnapVsQuine: the determination of intension is an empirical hypothesis that can be tested by observing language habits.

Extensionalist thesis / QuineVsCarnap: the determination of intension is ultimately a question of taste, the linguist is free because it cannot be tested. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise either.
Quine: the completed encyclopedia is ex pede Herculem, i.e. we risk an error if we start at the end of the foot. But we can take advantage of it!
If, on the other hand, we delay a definition of synonymity in the case of the lexicon, no problem arises, nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.

Intensionalist These/Carnap: pro: Example translation manual: the linguist begins:

(1) horse, horse

another linguist enters:

(2) Horse, horse or unicorn

since there is no unicorn, the two intentions have the same extension! ((s) Disjunction: for the extension two intentions can be assumed, if one is empty, like unicorn).
Extensionalistic thesis/Quine: if it is correct, there is no way to make an empirical decision between (1) and (2).
VII 152
Solution/CarnapVsQuine: the linguist not only has to calculate the real cases, but also the possible ones.
((s) David Lewis: applies modality not to objects, but to intensions, e.g. facts or characteristics!).
Ambiguity/Intensions/Carnap: Ambiguity can be overcome by providing suitable explanations and examples. For me there are no objections against modality.
But it is also not necessary:
For example, the linguist could simply describe cases to the native that he knows are possible and leave open whether there is something that fulfills the descriptions. (So e.g. describe a unicorn, or point to a corresponding picture, etc.).
The affirmative or negative answer will form an affirmative case for (1) or (2).
This shows that (1) and (2) are different empirical hypotheses.
Intension/Carnap: all logically possible cases of determination come into consideration. Also causally impossible! >Unicorn exampl
e, >Non-existence.

VII 158
Intension/Carnap: scope of a predicate, truth conditions. So that the speaker can attribute the predicate
Def analytical: if the intension includes all possible cases for the speaker
Def synonymous: two expressions with the same intension for a speaker
Def language/Carnap: system of related dispositions.
- - -
Newen I 120
Def Intension/Carnap: = truth conditions - Def Extension/Carnap: = truth value.
>Truth conditions, >Truth values.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977

R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008

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