Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefore, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Robert Brandom on Intensions - Dictionary of Arguments

I 671
Definition intension: functions from indices to extensions. A more robust type of content that is shared by the listener in the best case. >Extensions
I 672
Functions of the kind in question are so finely individuated that it is difficult to see how the use of an expression may determine that sometimes this and sometimes another function should be associated with it. (among others, reason for QuineVsIntensions).
Quine: reference instead of meaning. >Reference/Quine, >Meaning/Quine.
I 674
The difficulty with such an approach is exactly the one stressed by Quine: what exactly of these practices deserves to be characterized in a way that it deals with some assertions and inferences as privileged? This can only be set for artificial languages.
I 675
Intension/Extension/BrandomVsTradition: three-stage instead of two-stage approach:
1) inferential significance fundamental
2) extensional dimension in concepts of substitution-inferential definitions
3) equivalence classes of expressions that correspond to what is being spoken about.
Tradition: leaves out the communication dimension.
Brandom: Content not as a function, rather as practical account management.
I 792
Meaning/Reference/Sense/Frege/Brandom: only in the interaction with the world that lies outside the mind the "sense" determines the "meaning"; this has nothing to do with representation intentions, but certainly with success. >Sense.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

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> Counter arguments against Brandom
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions

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