Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Instrumentalism, science theory: the assumption that theories are useful tools for achieving goals. It is therefore secondary whether these theories are true. When comparing theories, truth ultimately plays the decisive role._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Bas van Fraassen on Instrumentalism - Dictionary of Arguments
Armstrong III 108 Definition instrumentalism/van Fraassen/Armstrong (van Fraassen, 1980, p.36): instrumentalism is similar to atheism: it is still speculative about the realm beyond the observable. It denies real unobserved entities. >Theoretical entities. Def Realism/Fraassen: realism is like theism: it accepts real unobserved entities. >Realism. Fraassen: pro agnosticism: agnosticism has a neutral attitude towards the ontological status of unobserved entities. >Ontology. --- Fraassen I 23 Instrumentalism: Thesis: theories are merely useful. The instrumentalism does not require any truth, only empirical adequacy. >Empirical adequacy. E.g. the assumption of the realistic truth of Copernican theory, for example, explains the instrumentalist utility of the Ptolemaean. N.B.: such an explanation would be impossible if all theories were regarded as instrumental. >Explanation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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