Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Individuation, philosophy: the picking out of an object by a determination by means of additional information which is not to be derived from a single statement which contains this object. For example, beliefs are individualized by content, not e.g. by the length of the character strings with which they are expressed. The contents of a belief are, in turn, not individuated by their repetition, but by other contents.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Peter M. Simons on Individuation - Dictionary of Arguments

I 129
Individuation/ontology/Simons: mere hyphenated words shall not create a new ontology, because they can not be individuated without the parts.
I 186
Individuation/mereology/Simon: for individuation mereological terms are important, e.g. to see what Fido is, we must be able to decide what is a part of it at a certain time, which overlaps with it and what is separated from it. Problem: Fido itself is not mereologically constant. Solution: we must know the limits within which metabolism is permitted. Type: the type does not specify which particular parts the thing has, but what type of parts it normally does have and what relations these usually relate to each other.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

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