Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Individuation, philosophy: the picking out of an object by a determination by means of additional information which is not to be derived from a single statement which contains this object. For example, beliefs are individualized by content, not e.g. by the length of the character strings with which they are expressed. The contents of a belief are, in turn, not individuated by their repetition, but by other contents._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Nozick on Individuation - Dictionary of Arguments
II 71ff I/Self/Individuation/Nozick: E.g. three completely bandaged persons with amnesia: X will die, Y will live, Z has 50/50 chance: they have to be moved into separate rooms: "the one who now hears my voice": this is not sufficient: Localization: (due to possible blindness), life history (for amnesia), physical description (ditto). Name: is insufficient: E.g. Oedipus. Originator of the tokens: is not sufficient: oral cavity + vocal chords ditto - Consciousness: is not sufficient: God covers the same description. >Identification, >Self-identification, >Localization, >Self-knowledge, >Self, >Person, >Action, >Memory, >Loss of memory, >Names._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Nozick
