Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Identification: A) Identification is the equivalence of two characterizations of an object in which new properties may be attributed to the object. B) Identification is the discovery that an object is a particular element from a set of objects. In this case, the number of initially assumed properties of the object may be reduced. See also specification, background, information._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Wiggins on Identification - Dictionary of Arguments
Tugendhat I 410 Identification/Wiggins: 1st know what it means that "f (a) is true" 2nd know how it is to be verified. >Verification, >Predication, >Classification. Tugendhat: this amounts to verification rules. Vs: "without preliminaries" is unclear and can be omitted. I 410/411 Which is the role of the singular terms cannot be presupposed! Here it is about the term of identification, not about the broad term of specification. Tugendhat: There are singular terms that are not identifying in the strict sense. Thus, depending on the nature of the singular terms, there could be different ways of determining whether the propositions are true. >Singular terms._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Identification
