Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John Perry on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 398ff Extra-sense/I/PerryVsCastaneda: can be recognized by others in the same way, does not explain the difference. >Extra-sense/Castaneda. Frank I 399f I/he/reference/relation/sense/meaning: difference: Quasi-indicator attributes reference, but does not establish it. >I/Castaneda, >quasi-indicator. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 - - - Frank I 402ff I/Castaneda/Perry: "I" is not replaceable by specific labeling, when behavior is explained - "I" is a "key index word". Problem: same sentence, but different speaker: false belief "I'm making a mess ...". >Sugar trail example. Incorrect solution: "And I am the one": again a new index word. - "Lack of conceptual component" does not help: I can believe that it is me, with no specific concept of me. False: description: "the one who makes the mess"; this does not help, because there is no connection to me. Frank I 403 Belief/I/Perry: Solution: we need a distinction: belief-state/belief-object. E.g. the event starts at 12:00 - that means, "now!" or "already finished" or "there is still time". Subject: the event beginning at 12:00 State: "now". Specific decsription without an index is not enough. >Indexicality, >Index words. Frank I 414 I/individuation/Perry: The following conditions are not enough: Propositions de re, de dicto, additional conceptual feature localization in space and time, relativization on people and places, two different descriptions without "I". >Propositions, >de re, >de dicto, >Spatial localization, >Description. Perry like Castaneda: 'I' is not replaceable. >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda, >H.-N. Castaneda. Time/Person-Proposition: does not make me different from the others: "J.P. yesterday at the super market" is just as true for others. - judgement context = opinion context: "The event begins now" is true at 12:00 - does not help. True/false/truth value: does not help: that mountain A is higher than B, may be true, but does not lead to the right path. There is nothing what all have in common. >Wanderers-example. Solution: the lost wanderers are in the same opinion state (individuated by index words), but not of the same opinion._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Perry
> Counter arguments in relation to I, Ego, Self
