Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Edmund Husserl on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments
Gadamer I 252
I, Ego, Self/Husserl/Gadamer: It is clear that the lifeworld is always at the same time a community world and contains the coexistence of others. It is a personal world, and such a personal world is always assumed to be valid in a natural attitude. >Lifeworld/Husserl.
But how is this validity to be justified from a performance of subjectivity?
Constitution/Phenomenology: For the phenomenological analysis of constitution [this, the justification of validity], represents the most difficult task, the paradoxes of which Husserl has tirelessly reflected upon. How can something arise in the "pure I" that has no objective validity, but wants to be itself? >Constitution/Husserl.
The reflective I knows itself as living in purposefulness, for which the living world is the ground. Thus the task of a constitution of the lifeworld (like that of intersubjectivity) is a paradoxical one. But Husserl considers all this to be apparent paradoxes.
Idealism/HusserlVsIdealism: [Husserl] himself assures that as a result of his thinking he has thoroughly overcome the fear of generational idealism. His theory of phenomenological reduction rather wants to bring the true meaning of this idealism to the first implementation. Transcendental subjectivity is the "primal ego" and not "one ego". For it, the ground of the given world is suspended. It is the irrelative par excellence, to which all relativity, including that of the researching ego, is related.
Gadamer I 253
Idealism/Husserl/Gadamer: Meanwhile, there is already a moment in Husserl's work that threatens to constantly break this framework. His position is in fact even more than a radicalization of transcendental idealism, and the function that the term gains with him is characteristic of this. >Life/Husserl.
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Husserl I 102
I, Ego, Self/principle of unity/Husserl: the I, ego or self remains identical through different acts of consciousness.
I-Pole/Husserl: the I-pole means to be attentive, to be focused on, to be busy with, to take a stand. Here the ego centers functions.
Stream of consciousness: is a temporal stream. The ego is identical. See also Person/Husserl._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991
II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
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