Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Roderick Chisholm on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments
I 23 I/Chisholm: Being oneself is not a property. - from this follows: false: "x has necessarily the property to be identical with x" - instead: "for every x applies necessarily ..." - there is no property "to be identical with x". >Ontology, >Properties. I 41 I/Anscombe: the thing from whose action this idea of an action is an idea, etc. ChisholmVsAnscombe: explains I by demonstrativum. I 43 I/CastanedaVsChisholm: pro propositions of the first person as concrete things with finite existence - never possible to express or capture foreign I-propositions. >Propositions, >Intensions. I 46f I/Self/Chisholm: it is not certain that each person can comprehend their own individual nature - emphatic reflexive:/Chisholm: "he himself" - the non-emphatic are a special case of the emphatic - E.g. it does not matter whether the engine controls the enginge, or the engine controls itself - in this case no non-emphatic reflexives are possible - but difference: whether the doctor treats the doctor or the doctor treats himself - difference whether psychological or nonpsychological predicates are applicable. - If at all psychological ones are possible, then not understanding the "he-himself" expression as a special case of the ordinary expression de re, but vice versa. >He himself, >Self. I 73 I/Russell/Chisholm: the biography to which this belongs - now: the time of this - here: the place of this - now/Chisholm: does not pick out an identifiable property, which should that be? - to express that the present is the only existing time, one needs "now" or a synonym - time: conjunction of events or facts. I 74 I/ChisholmVsAnscombe: tries to explain their use of "I" by their use of "this" ("I am this thing") - Vs: but with this she cannot explain my use of "I". ChisholmVsAnscombe: we need no demonstrativa (like Brentano: no identifying properties). I 78 "We are F"/Chisholm: not always conjunction "I am F and you are F". I 184 I/property/Chisholm: even if I do not have an individual nature, some of my properties are essential to me: perhaps my being-a-person. >Person._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Chisholm
