Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Actions, philosophy: Actions are conscious or unconscious human actions as opposed to physical events. The action can take place against the will of the agent, but only if the opposed will is not strong enough to prevent the execution entirely.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Donald Davidson on Actions - Dictionary of Arguments

Glüer II 108
Actions/Davidson: Action depends on description (Example: Mary) - Events are independent of description. >Events/Davidson
. E.g. Mary shoots the burglar and kills her father.
Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation.
Glüer II 109 f
Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis (cf. >anomalous monism) in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (Causal Interaction) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (Nomological Character) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws.
- - -
Brandom I 724
Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: there are two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved
I 726
Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - is description dependent.
Brandom I 727
She believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow).
I 728
Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - as in beliefs.
Brandom I 957
Accordion Effect/success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action. - Example Mountain Climber.
I 958
Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURDs: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded.
I 729
Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine.
I 957
Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto).
Intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established.
- - -
Glüer II 92
Quine: ontology is only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object.
Glüer II 96
Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: there are 2 types of adverbs resist:
1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable
2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted.
MontagueVsDavidson: Events are superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: to not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely)
Glüer II 110
Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation - ((s) Because the example of the differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers.)
((s) Something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.)
>Intentions, >Explanations, >Meaning, >Language.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


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