Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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Nancy Cartwright on Laws, fundamental - Dictionary of Arguments
I 3 Explanation/description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered descriptive, the fundamental laws are considered explanatory - problem: the explanatory power is lost in favor of the descriptive adequacy. >Physics, >Natural laws, >Laws, >Adequacy, >Explanation. I 102 Nature/reality/laws/Natural Laws/Cartwright: without accepting God and a book of nature we have no reason to assume that the phenomenological laws are derived from the fundamental laws. >Phenomena. I 112 Fundamental laws/Natural Laws/Cartwright: represent rather the relations between properties than between individuals - practice: for the engineer it is about objects instead of properties. >Properties, >Relations, >Objects._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
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