Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Laws: A. Laws are rules created and enforced by governments to regulate behavior, protect people's rights, and promote order and justice in society. - B. Laws of nature are fundamental principles that describe how the universe works. They are universal and unchanging. - C. The status of laws in the individual sciences is controversial, since they may only describe regularities. See also Natural laws, Regularities, Principles._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Nozick on Laws - Dictionary of Arguments
II 144 Law/Laws of Nature/LoN/Language/Interpretation/WittgensteinVsArmstrong/Nozick: laws cannot be formulated linguistically, because they can always be interpreted differently. >Rule Following, >Interpretation, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Laws/Armstrong, >L. Wittgenstein, >D. Armstrong. II 145 Event/Law/LoN/Relation/Hume/Nozick: Hume: the relations between events are not logical. - The connection between the event and the law cannot be causal. >Causality/Hume, >Causal laws, >Causal relation, >Events. Another problem: logical connections have to be interpreted in turn. >Logic, >Necessity, >de re necessity. II 146 If the interpretation should be fixed, then the law should include something analogous to reflexive self reference. - This is mysterious itself. >Self-reference. Hence, we must not treat laws related with statements. - Because of Gödel there is probably not a "picture of all the facts" from which all factual statements can be derived. Determinism/Nozick: therefore should not rely on derivability from causal laws. >Derivation, >Derivability, >Determinism, >K. Gödel. II 146 Law/fact/general/special/make true/Nozick: if a law is not treated as a quasi-statement but as a general fact, how can it make individual states true? - How can "make true" be a real relation between facts? Then it must be related to causality. Thereby, the problems would be repeated. - That laws should limit facts, only names the problem. >Truth, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 147 If laws are mere descriptions, they explain nothing. - If they are to be mere conjunctions of events, then there is no fundamentality and no hierarchy. >Conjunction. But: Fundamental orders may be variously interpreted or axiomatized again. >Order, >Facts, >World, >Totality. II 148 Instead fundamental order: "organic unity". Problem: this is not a justification. - Analogous to the artwork. Problem: Justification needs again a fundamental order. Possible Worlds with reflexive self-subsumption could be more coherent, than those without reflexivity. >Possible worlds. Then the question of why a particular statement applies, is repeated. - The problem of the relationship between facts and laws cannot be solved here. >Explanation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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