Saul A. Kripke on Object - Dictionary of Arguments
Queen Example: an object with another origin is not the same object.
Kripke: it seems to me that every item that has a different origin is not that item.
For example, this table could be made of a completely different wood, or even ice. Question, can we imagine that this table was not made of wood? No, it seems to me that we can only imagine it as another table that is similar in all its exterior details. (The vagueness of the concept of a piece of matter raises some problems.)
Principle A: Origin is essential.
Principle B: Substance is essential.
I 132 (footnote)
There are various complications here. The temporal question is not to be confused with the timeless question of properties. Nor the timeless question of what properties the object could have had. The question of whether the table could have turned into ice is irrelevant here. What matters is whether it could have originally been made of other wood.
We usually ask here whether the universe could have developed differently from a certain point in time. For example, I could have been deformed if the fertilized egg, from which I did not originate, had been damaged, even though I did not exist at that time.
Kripke: I don't want to say that only the origin and substance are essential.
Properties: The piece of wood from which the table was made could have been processed into a vase instead, in which case the table would never have existed. So "to be a table" seems to be an essential feature of the table.
Even if the question of whether an item really has a property has been decided, the question of whether this property is essential for the item may be vague.
_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984