Nelson Goodman on Object - Dictionary of Arguments
Possible objects: A real color or a real place do not need to occur at all times. Just as little a real man must live forever. (>real >reality).
Object: not time-place, but "total object" p + t, parts have no relationship to each other. Just as the parts of two cars on two sides of the street form no car. (Similar to Quine)
The predicate "time-place" applies to many objects which consist of a place and a time, but not to all, for example, not to t+p.
Possible objects/Goodman: real objects form a smaller subclass of the possible - "possible time-place"are no new real object but new predicate for old real sum object p + t - The predicate "time-place" does not apply to p + t. - Similar to "biggt" and "flexible": p + t = "time-place-able".
Continuation/predicates statement: "Time-place is red": two continuations: it continues the two predicates "red" and "time-place" on p + t.
The possible objects and predicates disappear. Predicates refer to reality, but have extensions that are related in a very specific way with the extensions of certain manifest predicates and are usually further._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997