Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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Roderick Chisholm on Object - Dictionary of Arguments
I 27 Eternal objects/e.o./Chisholm: are present if x has necessarily the property H and H cannot possess anything else, and there is a fact which implies H and necessarily consists. I 60 Object/Chisholm: e.g. the thing that is believed to be wise. Content/Chisholm: the property to be wise. >Content. Chisholm: but we do not need to accept a third thing that involves the thing as well as the property because attribution is not an acceptance of propositions. >Attribution. Self-attribution/Chisholm: needs no identification. >Identification I 62 Otherwise false mixing of direct and indirect attribution. I 63 Eternal objects/Chisholm: relations, properties, facts. Properties: one has an opinion about a property, if one assigns to the property a further property - i.e. as a thing to which one is in a relation e.g., contrast, uniqueness, frequency. Individuation: properties are individuated by properties. >Individuation, >Relations, >Properties, >Facts._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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