Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Use theory, philosophy of language: the term was formed following a thesis of L. Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, § 43. (Original in German) You can explain the use of the word "meaning" for a large class of cases - though not in all cases of its use - as the meaning of a word is its use in the language." - This thesis applies to words and cannot be extended to whole sentences. See also use, word meaning, sentence meaning, language acquisition, meaning theory, reference._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Michael E. Dummett on Use Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
I 31 DummettVsuse theory: The disadvantage is that this is substantially non-systematic. According to Wittgenstein, however, it is an advantage, because he emphasizes the variety of speech acts. Dummett: orderliness but is not everything. The use theory is likely to assume that a significant part of the language is already understood. I 31 Use gives meaning - sence gives reference (Frege). - Meaning is not the same as reference: E.g. Unicorn. Use theory of meaning >speech act theory. I 29 Use/Truth/Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes the concept of truth superfluous. >meaning before truth. - - - III (a) 10 Use theory/Dummett: Circumstances not sufficient - we need the purpose of why we use a word - even with classification valid/invalid always of interest (purpose). - - - III (e) 196 Use theory/Dummett: sentences, not words have use. III (e) 200 E.g. use of money: here one must understand the whole institution. - - - I Schiffer 223f Use theory/Understanding/Meaning/Manifestation/Dummett/SchifferVsDummett: behavioristically - (also othersVsDummett) - from it does not follow anti-realism - Dummett himself uses psychological vocabulary - why should one have to be able to show understanding? - Own use should be sufficient. I 225 McDowellVsDummett: Martians still cannot understand us, because the intentional (content-determining) cannot be reduced to the non-intentional. I 227 Knowing whether something counts as verification, could depend on extra-linguistic knowledge and not on the understanding of the sentence - QuineVsDummett: direct Verific. cond. cannot exist for every sentence - ((s)> Quine: ~ theories are not verifiable sentence by sentence). - Sure there are meaningful sentences that have no discernible conditions which would prove the sentence to be true or false. I 228 Pain/Verification/Wittgenstein/Dummett/Schiffer: Dummett cites Wittgenstein with consent: that pain behavior can be refuted - SchifferVsDummett: then the meaning theory needs both contestable criteria and contestable conditions - problem: this is true for most empirical judgments._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Use Theory
