Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Functional explanation: A functional explanation focuses on the purpose of something. Functional explanations are common in many different fields, including science, engineering, and philosophy. They can also be used to design new systems. See also Explanations, Function, Functional Analysis._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Daniel Dennett on Functional Explanation - Dictionary of Arguments
Lanz I 300 Dennett/Lanz: functional analysis makes an optimality condition. (The machine uses its energy to carry out its tasks). Intentional analysis is similar: the agent is rational: he has goals that he should have because of his constitution and his place in the world. He also has opinions that he should have. Thus, only the physicalist, causal explanation remains. So if one asks, what are the relevant causal factors for the educated behavior which can either be explained functionally or intentionally depending on interest and complexity of the behavior, then only the physical explanation provides information. It follows that it is an illusion to believe that intentional states are in turn causes of other mental states and causes of action. Psychological characterizations are merely heuristic and no naturalistic descriptions. (DennettVsEveryday Psychology). >Folk Psychology. - - - Dennett I 276 Function/causality/Dennett: Problem: did the first nucleotides have a function or simply causal powers? Did the clay crystals (Cairns-Smith) possess real teleological properties or just "something like" teleological properties? Function/Game of Life/Dennett: Do the gliders have the "function" of movement or do they just move easily? Dennett I 301 Function/function analysis/Dennett: a now present form has always emerged from a process. Therefore it is accessible to the functional analysis. Fodor/Dennett: the requirement that an organism works smoothly at any stage imposes iron restriction on its subsequent properties. A functional analysis is complete only when it confirms that a construction method was established. Cf. >Functionalism, >Functional role, >Functions, >Intentionality._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Dennett
> Counter arguments in relation to Functional Explanation
