Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Jerry Fodor on Functionalism - Dictionary of Arguments

Dennett I 292 ff
Fodor/Dennett: the necessity of an organism to work smoothly at any stage imposes iron restrictions on its subsequent properties.
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Fodor IV 127
Functionalist: the causal role distinguishes desires and beliefs ((s) internal in the mind).
SemanticsVsFunctionalism: the relationship between mind/world is determining. >World/Thinking
, >Causal roles.
IV 127
Semantic properties/Fodor/Lepore: functionalism: the semantic properties are derived from the functional (causal) role. So beliefs and desires are distinguished by the causal role. On the other hand: semantics: the semantic properties are derived from the relation of mind/world.
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Frank I 61 ~
FodorVsFunctionalism: functionalism does not grasp the qualia, nothing would be a token of the general type of pain, even if it were linked typically with all other psychological states. Argument of the missing qualia: the organism could behave without them jsut the same. Shoemaker: failure of qualia is unthinkable because of networking. >Qualia, >Qualia/Chalmers.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor IV
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


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