Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Extension, philosophy: an object, for example, the planet Venus as a material body, independent from the manner in which it is singled out. In contrast, intension is the way in which the object is given or is represented, e.g. Morning star or Evening star. See also intensions, identity, identity conditions, reference, meaning, assertibility conditions, propositional attitudes, opacity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Extensions - Dictionary of Arguments
Graeser I 60 Extension/Quine/Graeser: when bachelor/unmarried man are coextensive, then why are they not just randomly empirically (contingent) - not sure if it is a matter of meaning. Lauener XI 175 Reference/Extension/singular term/general term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular terms: have a reference - general terms and sentences have an extension. >Singular Terms/Quine, >General Terms/Quine. XII (c) 51 Predicate/co-extensive/extension-equal/coextensiveness/synonymy/Quine: coextensive predicates: e.g. equilateral/equivalent triangle E.g. featherless biped/rational creature: It was never clear when to say that the predicates had the same meaning. Extension: (here = reference) is safe. Meaning: the intension is uncertain. Translation indeterminacy: here: across to Extension/Intension. >Indeterminacy/Quine, >Intensions/Quine. VII (b) 21 Extension/meaning/Quine: e.g. "living creature with heart" - "living creature with kidneys": (general term): same extension, different meaning. VII (e) 89 Extensionality Principle/Quine: P1 ((x ‹ y ) › ((y ‹ x) › (x = y))) that is, a class is determined by its elements. ((s) If x and y are subsets of each other, then they are equal). VII (f) 115 General Term/predicate/Quine: Predicates are not names of classes. This does not mean that there are not often classes that are associated with predicates without being named by them. For example, if we are talking about the extension of a general term or predicate: The class of all things of which the predicate is true. Thus, the theory of validity appeals to classes but not to the individual statements represented by schemes of quantifier logic (quantificational theory). Example: (Ex)(x is a dog . x is white) it does not involve an appeal to an abstract extension of a predicate. >Predicates/Quine. VII (f) 116 Truth values/extension/Quine: even validity and the extension of predicates can be eliminated through truth value tables (truth tables). For an extensional treatment of nominalism see VII (f) 118 > Nominalism. IX 1 Extensionality law: Classes are identical if their elements are the same. This does not apply to attributes! >Classes/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Extensions
