Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Extension, philosophy: an object, for example, the planet Venus as a material body, independent from the manner in which it is singled out. In contrast, intension is the way in which the object is given or is represented, e.g. Morning star or Evening star. See also intensions, identity, identity conditions, reference, meaning, assertibility conditions, propositional attitudes, opacity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Hartry Field on Extensions - Dictionary of Arguments
II 359 Syntax/Field: syntactic phrases do not need the concept of extension. >Syntax, >Extensionality, >Sentences, cf. >Intensions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
||
> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Extensions
