Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome![]() | |||
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Ethics, philosophy: ethics is concerned with the evaluation and justification of actions and ultimately a justification of morality. See also good, values, norms, actions, deontology, deontic logic, consequentialism, morals, motives, reasons, action theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Robert Nozick on Ethics - Dictionary of Arguments
II 17 Ethics/Nozick: there is no argument, which Hitler had to bow to. - This means that we cannot regard ethics as absolute, but: E.g. Heimson: does not bring our belief system about personal identity in the same way at risk. - We have more of a "How's that possible?" - Question about ethics than about personal identity. --- II 118 Categorical imperative/Kant/Nozick: when the content could be extracted from the form, it would not be a "hard fact" (brute fact) anymore. - It would arise necessarily from the form. --- II 570 Ethics/Nozick: how important is it, anyway? - As long as the meaning of our lives is not shown, ethics and values appear to be meaningless. --- II 631 Ethics/moral/reduction/Reductionism/Nozick: VsReductionism: infringes the principle that everything has a value in itself. - NozickVsVs: this is not only theoretically wrong but also morally wrong._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |