Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Essentialism: the view that objects have some of their properties necessarily. See also essence, necessity de re, necessity, contingency, properties, actualism, possible worlds.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Christopher Peacocke on Essentialism - Dictionary of Arguments

II 322
Essentialism/Wiggins/Peacocke: if we want to read Wiggins

[neclx1[Human(x1)]](Socrates)

as an essentialist sentence, that Socrates is necessarily a human being, then nothing can be a human being without existing.
>Necessity/Wiggins
, >de re necessity, >D. Wiggins, >de re, >de dicto, cf. >Barcan formula.
The translation into semantics of possible worlds would then be:
"In every world in which Socrates exists, he is a human being.
In general: [neclx1...lxn [A(x1...xn)]](t1...tn) - i.e. "In every world w in which all of t1...tn exist, t1...tn have the relation A in w" - if we wanted to make similar existential assumptions in the antecedence for expressions occurring in A(x1...xn) here, there would be no hope of finding a difference in the truth conditions between these forms:
neclx1lx2[Rx1x2](a,b),
neclx1[Rax1](b) and
neclx1[Rx1b](a) - this shows that T1 contains false theorems.
>Semantics of Possible Worlds, >Possible Worlds.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976


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