Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Essentialism: the view that objects have some of their properties necessarily. See also essence, necessity de re, necessity, contingency, properties, actualism, possible worlds.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Saul A. Kripke on Essentialism - Dictionary of Arguments

III 375
Necessary de re (Quine: = "essentialism") is incomprehensible. Other authors: de re must be reduced to de dicto (also belief de re).
>de re, >de dicto/Kripke, >Belief de re, >Essence/Kripke.
- - -
Kripke II 215
De re/essentialism/Kripke: e.g. a claim de re is the claim that the real number of planets (nine) necessarily has the property of being odd.
>Planets example.
Kripke: essentialists like I am think this is true (KripkeVsQuine).
Also: when we say for example "Jones believes that the richest debutante in Dubuque will marry him" we mean that Jones' opinion has a certain content, namely that the richest debutante will actually marry him.
De dicto/Kripke: (example): here we believe of a girl who is (in fact) the richest in Dubuque and of whom Jones believes that she will marry him.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

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> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Essentialism

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