Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Essentialism: the view that objects have some of their properties necessarily. See also essence, necessity de re, necessity, contingency, properties, actualism, possible worlds._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Saul A. Kripke on Essentialism - Dictionary of Arguments
III 375 Necessary de re (Quine: = "essentialism") is incomprehensible. Other authors: de re must be reduced to de dicto (also belief de re). >de re, >de dicto/Kripke, >Belief de re, >Essence/Kripke. - - - Kripke II 215 De re/essentialism/Kripke: e.g. a claim de re is the claim that the real number of planets (nine) necessarily has the property of being odd. >Planets example. Kripke: essentialists like I am think this is true (KripkeVsQuine). Also: when we say for example "Jones believes that the richest debutante in Dubuque will marry him" we mean that Jones' opinion has a certain content, namely that the richest debutante will actually marry him. >Content/Kripke. De dicto/Kripke: (example): here we believe of a girl who is (in fact) the richest in Dubuque and of whom Jones believes that she will marry him._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
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> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Essentialism
