Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Epistemology, philosophy: examines the conditions for the emergence of knowledge and the basis for justification and confirmation. Epistemology cannot explain special cases in which someone who has less information may give more correct answers. See also knowledge, theory, justification, confirmation, reliability.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Epistemology - Dictionary of Arguments

XII 86/87
Epistemology/Quine: a) conceptual side: is explanation of terms by terms.
b) applicability/validity: by truth.
II 35
Epistemology is about the question of how we animals managed to produce this ((s) highly differentiated) science in view of the sketchy neural input. This study shows that shifts due to the representative function would not have done any less justice to this input. This does not mean rejecting ontology. We can refuse them!
II 36
Truth must not be confused with evidence. Truth is intrinsic and there is nothing about it. See also >Naturalized Epistemology
.
V 15
Berkeley/Traditional Epistemology: Problem: how do we know that there are objects and that science is true?
V 16
Quine: the introduction of the physical sense organs would have appeared to them as a circle.
V 17
Epistemology/Quine: the emancipated epistemologist works as an empirical psychologist (with >stimuli instead of >sense data, but without >gestalt theory.)
VsGestalt Theory: it is about the connection of stimuli with receptors, not with consciousness.
V 38
Epistemology/Quine: main question: if our theory of the outside world is true, how could we ever come up with it?
X 12
Inductive Logic/Quine: is indistinguishable from epistemology.
X II 86
Epistemology/Quine: we can look at it here analogous to mathematics: just as mathematics should be reduced to logic or to logic + set theory, so should
empirical knowledge be somehow based on sensory experience.
XII 87
a) conceptual side: is there to explain the concept of the body from the sensory experience
b) (validity, truth): is there to justify our knowledge of nature from the sensory experience.
Epistemology/Hume: a) conceptual side: here he equated it immediately with sensory experiences. I.e. an apple is a new apple in every moment.
b) Validity, truth: Hume failed here and we still have no solution.
Problem: general statements as well as singular statements about the future gain nothing in certainty by being understood as if they were talking about sensory impressions.
Quine: We are still facing the same problem as Hume. On the conceptual side, however, progress was made. Solution: Bentham:
XII 88
Def Theory of Fiction/Context Definition/Entire Sentences/Word/holophrastic/Bentham/Quine: Bentham discovered the
Def Context Definition/Bentham/Quine: (Vs normal definition): to explain a term we do not need to specify a reference object, not even a synonymous word or phrase, we just need to show how to translate all complete sentences containing the term.
Epistemology/Quine: apart from context theory, epistemology was enriched by set theory. Then you do not have to equate bodies with sense data or context definitions:
XII 89
Def Object/Quine: Solution: Objects as sets of sets of sensations; then there may be a category of objects that enjoy the very qualities that bodies are supposed to have.
Vs: this is not as untouchable as the context definition. Because of the recourse to the problematic ontology of quantities.
Epistemology/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements and statements about the future are uncertain if they are understood to be about sense data or sensory impressions) is still unsolved today.
Carnap/Quine: his constructions would have made it possible to translate all sentences about the world into sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory.
XII 90
QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observation terms does not mean that it can be proven with logical and set-theoretical means from observation sentences.
((s) Means of expression are not evidence. (> exterior/interior, description levels, circularity).
Epistemology/Quine: N.B.: to want to endow the truths about nature with the full authority of immediate experience is just as doomed to failure as the return of the truths of mathematics to the potential insight of elementary logic.
>Epistemology/Carnap.
XII 91
Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology?
TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular.
No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. See > Rational reconstruction.
XII 98
Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. It studies the human subject.
Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation.
XII 99
Epistemology/Quine:
old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data.
New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology.

Quine: at the same time, the old relationship remains: epistemology is included in the empirical sciences and at the same time science is included in the epistemology. ((s) Epistemology studies the subject and the subject studies epistemology.)
This is not a circle because we have given up the dream of deducing all science from sense data.
This also solves the old mystery of seeing. See also Seeing/Quine.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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