Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Epistemic/ontological: ontological questions relate to the existence of entities that cause perceptions - epistemic questions reflect their recognizability. The question of a principal recognizability itself is ontological and metaphysical. See also metaphysics, ontology, existence, realism, reality, perception._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Epistemic/ontologic - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 59 Epistemic: e.g. the situation of radical interpretation is epistemic. IV 105 Epistemic/Fodor/Lepore: what made the arguments of the previous chapters epistemic was the assumption that it is metaphysically constitutive for content that language must be radically interpretable. E.g. the question of which sentences a speaker holds to be true and under what conditions. Language/Davidson: language must be radically interpretable. Contrast: transcendental, >Radical interpretation, Cf. >Immanence, >Analyticity/syntheticity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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