Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
|Disposition, philosophy: the tendency for a certain behavior that is not yet occurred at the present time. Problem Statements containing dispositional terms, cannot be determined in their truth value, as the relevant event has not yet occurred. In classic logic can even be concluded that a sentence containing a dispositional term will be trivially true as long as the relevant circumstances are not realized. See also dispositional terms, counterfactual conditionals, law statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Saul A. Kripke on Dispositions - Dictionary of Arguments
Stegmüller IV 41
Disposition/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/VsKripke/Stegmüller: the function can be read from the disposition - then the disposition for errors must be part of the overall disposition.
KripkeVs: this again requires facts relating to the correct table or correct function. Kripke: but the function does not exist before the disposition. Competence cannot explain rules, because it presupposes rules. Competence is normative, not descriptive.
Stegmüller IV 47
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: if one understands "meaning" as what I am currently meaning determines what I am to mean in the future, then it is normative, not descriptive.
>Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention.
Disposition Theory: the disposition theory claims to be descriptive but it is not. Language/Kripke: strictly speaking, we must not problematize the language because we could then no longer formulate our question understandably._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
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