Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Disposition, philosophy: the tendency for a certain behavior that is not yet occurred at the present time. Problem Statements containing dispositional terms, cannot be determined in their truth value, as the relevant event has not yet occurred. In classic logic can even be concluded that a sentence containing a dispositional term will be trivially true as long as the relevant circumstances are not realized. See also dispositional terms, counterfactual conditionals, law statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Jerry Fodor on Dispositions - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 120 Holism/Ryle/Fodor/Lepore: e.g. wish/desire/Ryle: thesis: desire requests are a kind of behavioral disposition. Fodor/LeporeVsHolism: if it is semantically necessary to execute the action that leads to it, then it is contingent. >Necessity, >Contingency, >Actions, >Semantics._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |