Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John Perry on de re - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 412 f de re/trivial theory: de re is usually explained by de dicto. >de dicto, >Explanations. Frank I 414 Localization/localizing opinions/re/erry: it's not surprising that de re doesn't help with localization: De re-propositions do not remain indexical. >Localization, >Propositions, >Indexicality, >Index words. Propositions that are partly individuated by objects remain just as insensitive to the essence of localizing opinions as those that are entirely individuated by concepts. >Individuation, >Terms, >Objects. The decisive change in my situation is concealed: I notice that the untidy customer was not only for the customer with the torn package, but for me. ((s) Two different descriptions without "I" are not sufficient). >Sugar trail example, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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