Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Maxwell J. Cresswell on de re - Dictionary of Arguments
II 18 Belief de re/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: a de re belief about the numbers 5 and 7, so that they have a certain property, namely the property of adding up to 12. de re: is the correct analysis for sentences with propositional attitude, because it is sensitive to the individual parts, not only for the whole that-sentence. >That-clause, Fince-grained/coarse-grained, >Propositional attitudes. The opposite position: "propositional account" - this corresponds to the relation theory. >Relation theory. Problem: the proposition: that 5 + 7 = 12 is the same as that 12 = 12 - but this cannot be paraphrased like this for the attribution of propositional attitude. II 22f Belief de re/Example Ralph/Ortcutt:/Cresswell: problem: that Ortcutt loves Ortcutt, should be the same proposition as that Ortcutt loves himself. >Way of givenness, >Ortcutt expample. For Ralph: not through the brown hat. - Therefore Ralph only agreed with the first proposition, not with the second - but the first is de dicto. >de dicto. II 144 Belief de re/Cresswell: is not compatible with an abstention from the judgment. - From "x does not believe G of y" cannot be concluded - "x does not believe that G of y". Kaplan: that is also a solution for Example Ralph/Ortcutt. II 182 De re/essence/Lewis/Cresswell: (Lewis 1979a(1), p. 540): Knowledge of the nature is a too strong condition for reference de re. >Reference. 1. Lewis, D.K. (1979). Attitudes de dicto and de se. Philosophical Review 88. pp 513-43._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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