Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Roderick Chisholm on de re - Dictionary of Arguments
I 30f Meaning De Re/Chisholm: attributing to another thing the property: e.g. "you are meant by me as happy". Other authors Vs: such property does not exist, the spirit cannot leave the circle of his ideas. >Circular reasoning, >Attribution. I 36 E.g. Mach: de re with respect to himself: "what a shabby school master..." - but not de dicto: "I am a shabby school master.". I 37 de dicto: the greatest man accepts the proposition that the greatest man is wise. - De Re: there is an x such that x is the same as the greatest man, and x is considered to be wise by x. I 38 (P) The greatest man accepts the proposition that the greatest man is wise. (de dicto) - (Q) There is an x such that x is the same as the greatest man, and x is considered to be wise by x. (de re) ((s) The greatest man thinks himself that he is wise - See below: (S"), (P"): direct attribution instead of de re and de dicto). I 39 "He Himself"/Chisholm: implies the expression de re, unlike the term de dicto. Cf. >Quasi-indicator/Castaneda, >He himself. - - - II 121 Belief De Re/Chisholm: a) due to the accepted proposition that X has the property F - b) strict form: further proposition knows that the object is the only one to possess the further property C - ("epistemic proximity"). II 122 But that does not help much, because this can still be a knowledge by description - that is the problem of intentionality - "epistemically closer relationship" still not found. >Knowledge, >Description, >Acquaintance, >Identification, >Individuation. Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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