Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| De dicto: statements about the nature of linguistic expressions and their consequences are de dicto. Concepts necessarily have certain characteristics, as opposed to objects (res) the properties of which are considered as contingent by many authors. See also de re, modality, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on de dicto - Dictionary of Arguments
II 249 De dicto: de dicto only concerns mental contents. De re: de re concerns relationships between people and objects. SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto. >Belief/Searle, >Belief/Quine. II 261 De dicto/belief/SearleVsAll: all beliefs are de dicto. De re beliefs are a subclass. QuineVs: an irreducible belief de re is between the believer and the objects in addition to the de dicto beliefs (much stronger thesis). >Brains in a vat: are purely de dicto. SearleVsQuine: if the world would change, the beliefs would change, even if everything stays the same in the head. II 262 A general desire for a sailing boat: is de dicto. A desire for a more specific one: would be de re. II 263 SearleVsQuine: then in the general case the beliefs are allegedly context free but: BurgeVsQuine: contextually bound beliefs cannot be characterized completely by their intentional content (not only as a relation between concept and object). De dicto/Burge: e.g. red hat in the fog, "there is a man who ...". Searle: that is enough to individuate any de re-counterpart. The same man can belong to >satisfaction conditions for very different perceptions. II 268 Thesis: there are forms of >intentionality that are not conceptual, but also not de re._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
