Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
|De dicto: statements about the nature of linguistic expressions and their consequences are de dicto. Concepts necessarily have certain characteristics, as opposed to objects (res) the properties of which are considered as contingent by many authors. See also de re, modality, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Saul A. Kripke on de dicto - Dictionary of Arguments
KripkeVsDonnellan: Donnellan's theory is correct, but does not refute Russell’s (better, because more consistent) theory. The distinction referential/attributive has nothing to do with distinction de re/de dicto (Donnellan ditto).
Donnellan/Kripke: de dicto: can be neither attributive nor referential: the quote is not about an object (this is already found in Frege). Referential: cannot be de re, e.g. "The number of planets is odd": is attributive, i.e. not about this exact subject "whatever". "Necessarily odd": is just as attributive, e.g. "The murderer, no matter who, has committed the murder": is just as attributive, but de re. Indirect speech: is neither referential nor attributive.
>Indirect speech, >de re, >Planets example._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
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