Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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Hartry Field on Definiteness - Dictionary of Arguments
II 226 Definiteness/determined/definition/definite/vagueness/precision/(s)"definite"/Field: we cannot define "definitively true" ("determined", "determinately") by truth - we must conceive it as a reinforcement. Solution : Operator: "Definiteness-Operator"/dft-operator: this one is independent of truth-theoretical terms - but there is no physical information which decides. "Determined" as basic concept - rules correspond to those for "necessary" - then the law of the excluded middle applies - it is definitely the case that he is either bald/non-bald. N.B.: it can still be the case then that he is neither definitely bald nor definitely non-bald - because there is no distribution about disjunction. II 229 Definiteness-Operator: is used so that the deflationism can distinguish vagueness from non-vagueness - "strong-true" must be defined with definiteness-Operator. II 231 Vagueness of higher level/Field/VsFine: the definiteness-operator is more natural than the Penumbar - FieldVsPenumbra: this solution is unnatural. >Penumbra. II 228 Limit/Vagueness/definiteness-Operator/Field: We need the definiteness-operator ("determined") to characterize a certain limit from a limit. II 238 Vagueness/deflationism/Field: "definitive-operator": adds additional conditions to the game under which a statement is definitely true. - (s) Not merely literal repetition). - Referential indeterminacy/(s): then a general sentence only applies to a part. - This one is sorted out by the definiteness-operator._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Definiteness
