Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Designation: ascription of a character to an object that allows the localization within an order, as opposed to naming. See also denotation, individuation, identification, specification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Roderick Chisholm on Designation - Dictionary of Arguments
I 166 ff Planet/Denoting/Designating/Kaplan: Planets example: if you take as a necessary name a for the number nine, then you believe of a that it is an even number, then: in "x is even", you can replace x with a. ChisholmVs: Denoting (linguistically) is not helpful, cannot be a basic concept if intentionality is a basic concept: we explain the linguistic with the intentional. >Planets example, >Intentionality, >Basic conepts. I 167 Instead: Designating: numeral necessary because of successor relation! - It brings us the object closer - Numerals: its meaning happens to involve a property that constitutes an individual being of the number, a property for which applies that the number necessarily has it (E.g. successor - unlike names) (!). >Propoer names, >Singular terms, >Numerals. I 168 Designate/Chisholm: must necessarily bring features: "the property blue" instead of "the color of the sky", E.g. "All men are mortal" instead of "Aristotle's favorite proposition". >Features._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Chisholm
