Concept/Wittgenstein: ca">

Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Concept: a concept is a term for an entity with certain properties. The properties of an object correspond to the features of the concept. These concept features are necessary in contrast to the properties of an individual object, which are always contingent.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Ludwig Wittgenstein on Concepts - Dictionary of Arguments

II 32
Concept/Logical Form/Wittgenstein: E.g. "thing", "complex", "number" are not concepts, but logical forms.
Concept/Wittgenstein: can be expressed as a propositional function - Number: is a pseudo concept - must occur within the brackets - e.g. (Example number). Fx. >Numbers
.
False: (e.g.).x is a number - wrong: (e.g.).x is a thing - AF: f() = () is a human. But not: f () = () is a number!
II 34
Pseudo Concept: e.g. "color", "primary color": it draws a limit to language - Concept: e.g. red: draws a line in language. >Colours, >Language.
II 39
Point: (in maths) not a concept.
II 254
Concept/Meaning/Experience/Wittgenstein: the fact that a thing corresponds to a concept is not an empirical fact. - In a sense, it must always have corresponded to it. - ((s) but our concepts are like rules) - ((s) therefore correspondence is not a natural fact) >Correspondence, >Representation, >Experience.
On the other hand: correspondence with a pattern is an empirical fact.
II 255
Rules: do not follow from the concept, but are constitutive for it - the rules are also not included in the concept - a symbol connected to a concept is just another symbol. >Symbols.
---
IV 46
Formal Concepts/Function/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 4,126 formal concepts - (e.g. numbers, name) - cannot be represented by a function - each variable is the sign of a formal concept. >Signs.
IV 46f
Pseudo Concept/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: e.g. object - the variable name x is its real sign - correct use: "(e.g.) ..." - otherwise pseudo-sentences are formed - Pseudo-sentence: -there are objects- correct sentence: e.g. -there are books - Pseudo-sentence: to speak of the number of all objects.

_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Send Link

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z