Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning theory: a theory that seeks to explain the meaning of meaning. Problem the concept of meaning and truth seem to presuppose each other._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Wiggins on Meaning Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
Avramides I 26 f Meaning Theory/Wiggins: layer model of meaning theory: 1st level: isolates what was said literally - in terms of >truth conditions, level of the sense, > formal theories (Frege, Davidson etc. >"Semantics"). 2nd level: >assertive force; use theories, >"pragmatics". Further levels: >perlocutionary effects, >conversational implicatures. - - - McDowell/Avramides: (McDowell 1998) can be seen as a further development of Wiggins' approach: 1. theory of sense: interacts with theory of force. One way: we start with the core theory, (theory of sense; central concept: truth). Then we develop the theory of force as a supplement. Another way: we start with a picture of the whole containing sense and force and then work our way to the core. Avramides: Question: whether a theory on the first (Wiggin's) level can be worked out in isolation. McDowell: development of Wiggins theories - 1st Theory of sense 2nd Theory of force - force, because we have to pay attention to the speaker._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Wiggins
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning Theory
