Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Meaning theory: a theory that seeks to explain the meaning of meaning. Problem the concept of meaning and truth seem to presuppose each other.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

John McDowell on Meaning Theory - Dictionary of Arguments

Avramides I 12
Meaning Theory/m.th./McDowell: Problem: if meaning is explained in terms of something else, this other must be explained again. - Thesis: indirect access to understanding and general language behavior without the concept of analysis. - Instead, depiction of the relations between concepts we already assume as understood. - With this the concept of meaning does not occur.
>Understanding/McDowell
, >Definition, >Explanation/McDowell, >Meaning/McDowell, >Circle.
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McDowell II IX
Translation semantics/Evans/McDowell: The point of view according to which the meaning theory has the task to frame rules which put sentences with their representations in relation - McDowellVs - E.g. x is a picture of F. - Problem: >Something "is a lion picture". ((s) This carries the singular qualities into the relation.) - instead: Solution/Davidson: satisfies neutrally. - N.B.: that removes the quotes.
II IX/X
Meaning Theory/m.th./McDowell: makes no relation between a sentence and itself. Instead, the m.th. represents a semantic property of the sentence by using it. - Translation: the knowledge that chauve bare is fulfilled, is no knowledge of a relation. - Instead: empirical relation between chauve and bald men. - This is just the use and not the mention.
>Mention, >Use, >Mistake mention/use, >Translation, >Convention T, >Truth theories, >Disquotational scheme.
II XII
Translation problem/Evans/McDowell: E.g. x "is a picture of F" - Solution/Davidson: "satisfies", the relation of satisfaction neutrally conceived: x satisfies F iff Wx. - W: is an expression of the meta-language. - Problem is still there: x satisfies "is a picture of a lion iff x is a picture of a lion" must be explained (by additional determination). - The manipulations allowed in the theorem must correspond to the meaning of the used object-language expressions.
II XVIIf
Meaning Theory/m.th./Evans/McDowell: not from truth theory, for radical interpretation at best says that the truth theory is true. - For a foreign language, however, a reliably true truth theory is at the same time a meaning theory.
II 43
Truth theory/McDowell: if one had a rule for f in "s, f is iff p" and this f could be replaced by "true". For this we need only the concept of the equality of the sentence-sense.
II 50
Truth Theory: must show the content of the speech actions recognizable - ((s) The right side uses part of the world (e.g. the actual nature of snow.) - ((s) Problem: compared with this the language is relatively completed.)
II 43ff
Meaning Theory/m.th./McDowell: Thesis: a theory of the sense should be a meaning theory at the same time. - In addition: theory of force. (Question, command, etc.)
>Theory of force.
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Dummett III 130f
Definition "Exuberant Theory"/meaning theory/McDowell: attributes to the speaker knowledge of the conditions that an object must fulfill in order to be a bearer of a name. - Definition "Sober theory"/McDowell: here the speaker knows only about the object that he is the name bearer of.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982


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