Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning theory: a theory that seeks to explain the meaning of meaning. Problem the concept of meaning and truth seem to presuppose each other._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Donald Davidson on Meaning Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
II 40 Meaning Theory/m.th./Davidson: instead of "notes" better: "Theory T includes .. " Then the entailment is a relation between the theory and an utterance of the speaker, claiming the entailment. >Entailment. Then T is a logical consequence of a sentence that is synonymous with my utterance of snow is true ... if ... " which brings the concept of synonymy in, but is not circular, because that is what we wanted for the notion of translation. This is the translation theory we have already attributed to the translator. >Translation. II 41 A meaning theory is impossible because it will cover no strict indexical elements - (this is not a problem for truth theory). >Truth theory. - - - Glüer II 18 Meaning/Meaning Theory: A) truth-conditional semantics (Davidson) B) verification theory of meaning. (Dummett, Putnam, Habermas). All verification theories suppose the verifiability of the assumed relationship- a) powerful version: a sentence is understood by someone who knows that it s true - b) weaker: Understanding is the knowledge of the verification process. (Dummett, Vienna Circle) - or acceptability: Putnam and Habermas) - then a person understands a sentence, who knows how it is verified or when it will be accepted as true. >Verification, >Method, >Verificationism. - - - Dummett III 137 Theory of meaning/axioms/Davidson: "Oxford" means Oxford: is not about the city of Oxford, that is called by the name "Oxford", but the reverse : about the name "Oxford", that it refers to the city of Oxford - which is more than mere knowledge of reference. - - - Schiffer I 3 Meaning Theory/Davidson: thesis: it should have the shape of an extensional, finally axiomatized truth theory of language in the Tarski-style. And somehow be relative to statements. >Disquotation scheme. David Lewis: truth conditions must be taken into account - Schiffer: but nothing follows in terms of the shape of the meaning theory - Dummett: meaning theory and theory of understanding are the same. >Understanding/Dummett._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning Theory
