Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Attribute (philosophy): word for an ascribed property (i.e. habitually associated with an object). Not identical with the property._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
W.V.O. Quine on Attributes - Dictionary of Arguments
VII (d) 75ff Attribute/Quine: an attribute may eventually be introduced in a second step: e.g. "squareness" according to geometrical definition, but then the name also requires substitutability, i.e. an abstract entity > Universals. X 7ff Attribute/Quine: an attribute corresponds to properties, predicates are not the same as attributes. >Predicates/Quine. IX 178ff Attribute/(s): an attribute corresponds to the quantity of those x for which a particular condition applies: {x: x ε a} all objects that are mortal. Predicate: "x is mortal", is not a quantity, but a propositional function. The denomination forms refer "φx", "φ(x,y)" to the attribution. >Propositional Function/Quine. XII 38 Attributary Attitude/Quine: E.g. hunting, needing, catching, fearing, missing. Important to note here is that e.g. "lion hunt" does not require lions as individuals but as a species - > Introduction of properties. IX 177 Attributes/Ontology/Russell: for Russell, the universe consisted of individuals, attributes and relations of them, attributes and relations of such attributes and relations, etc. IX 178f Extensionality/Quine: extensionality is what distinguishes attributes and classes. >Extensionality/Quine So Russell has more to do with attributes than with classes. Two attributes can be of different order and are therefore certainly different, and yet the things that each have one or the other attribute are the same. For example the attribute "φ(φ^x <> φy) where "φ" has the order 1, an attribute only from y. For example the attribute ∀χ(χ^x <> χy), where "χ" has order 2, again one attribute only from y, but one attribute has order 2, the other has order 3. (> Classes/ >Quantities/ >Properties). XIII 22 Class/set/property/Quine: whatever you say about a thing seems to attribute a property to it. Property/Attribute/Tradition/Quine: in earlier times one used to say that an attribute is only called a property if it is specific to that thing. (a peculiarity of this object is...). New: today these two expressions (attribute, property) are interchangeable. "Attribute"/Quine: I do not use this term. Instead I use "property". Identity/equality/difference/properties/Quine: if it makes sense to speak of properties, then it also makes sense to speak of their equality or difference. Problem: but it does not make sense! Problem: if everything that has this one property, also has the other. Shall we say that it is simply the same quality? Very well. But people do not talk like that. For example to have a heart/kidney: is not the same, even if it also applies to the same living beings. Coextensivity/Quine: two properties are not sufficient for their identity. Identity/properties/possible solution: is there a necessary coextensiveness? >Coextensive/Quine Vs: Necessity is too unclear as a term. Properties/Quine: We only get along so well with the term property because identity is not so important for their identification or differentiation. XIII 23 Solution/Quine: we are talking about classes instead of properties, then we have also solved the problem e.g. heart/kidneys. Classes/Quine: are defined by their elements. That is the way of saying it, but unwisely, because the misunderstanding might arise that the elements cause the classes in a different way than objects cause their. Def Singleton/Singleton/Single Class: class with only one element. Def Class/Quine: (in useful use of the word): is simply a property in the everyday sense, without distinguishing coextensive cases. XIII 24 Class/Russell/Quine: it struck like a bomb when Russell discovered the platitude that each containment condition (condition of containment, element relationship) establishes a class. (see paradoxes, see impredictiveness). Russell's Paradox/Quine: applies to classes as well as to properties. It also shatters the platitude that anything said about a thing attributes a property. Properties/Classes/Quine: all restrictions we impose on classes to avoid paradoxes must also be imposed on properties. Property/Quine: we have to tolerate the term in everyday language. Mathematics: here we can talk about classes instead, because coextensiveness is not the problem. (see Definition, > Numbers). Properties/Science/Quine: in the sciences we do not talk about properties._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
||
> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Attributes
